Mitigating Auditor Manipulation and Homogeneous Collusion via Rubric-Ranked Cross-Substrate Alignment Auditor Ensembles

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Abstract

Scalable oversight of autonomous agents relies on LLM-as-a-Judge panels, yet 2025–2026 audits show that homogeneous panels suffer from three compounding vulnerabilities: *correlated blind spots* ("Great Models Think Alike"), where judges exhibit high latent correlation ρ_{lat} and binary error correlation ρ_{bin}; *multi-round adaptive evasion*, where 6.5% single-pass miss rates compound across $R = 5$ rounds into $> 40\%$ evasion; and *sequential herding* in unsealed deliberation. We formalize oversight under an equicorrelated Gaussian copula and evaluate Cross-Substrate Rubric-Ranked Auditor Ensembles (`CS-RRAE`), combining $K = 3$ diverse families, SHA-256 commit-reveal sealing, and a Python `ast.parse` span verifier (Γ_{span}). We separate the Cantelli moment *upper bound* (governed by ρ_{bin}) from the exact 1D copula failure integral, derive a finite-K majority lower bound $\frac{1}{2}\Phi(\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p})/\sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}})$, and prove the closed-form $K \to \infty$ SLLN asymptotic floor $\Phi((\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p}) - \sqrt{1-\rho_{\text{lat}}}\Phi^{-1}(\tau_{\text{maj}}))/\sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}}) > 0$. Under matched base error rates across 19,200 trajectories ($n_{\text{adv}} = 600, n_{\text{honest}} = 600$/cell), cost-matched $K = 3$ `CS-RRAE` ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.14, \rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.056$) reduces 5-round evasion from 45.83% [41.89%, 49.83%] (single judge), 42.50% [38.60%, 46.49%] (3× homogeneous, $\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.78, \rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.497$), and 20.00% [16.99%, 23.39%] (3× cross-substrate without Γ_{span}) to 9.67% [7.55%, 12.29%], cutting benign false positives from 20.00% to 1.67% [0.91%, 3.04%].

1 Introduction

As autonomous language model agents are deployed to write production code, manage cloud resources, and execute multi-step workflows, human-in-the-loop review of every action trace has become infeasible [1, 6, 14]. Consequently, modern safety harnesses rely on automated alignment auditors—secondary language models or multi-agent panels tasked with inspecting agent trajectories for reward hacking, covert deception, and policy violations [3, 5, 19]. A common engineering assumption is that replacing a single LLM-as-a-Judge with a majority-vote ensemble of K LLM judges exponentially drives audit failures to zero via Condorcet's Jury Theorem [4].

1.1 Why homogeneous LLM-as-a-Judge panels fail under adaptive pressure

Empirical and theoretical studies published between 2025 and 2026 refute the independence assumption across three dimensions:

1. **Correlated error blind spots across models ("Great Models Think Alike"):** In a landmark study at ICML 2025, Goel et al. [4] demonstrated that language models trained on overlapping web corpora and alignment pipelines exhibit strongly correlated prediction errors,

causing naive majority voting to plateau at a high error floor. When an audited agent and its auditor share the same model family or fine-tuning distribution, adversarial formatting cues, sycophantic framing [16, 17], or steganographic conventions [11, 13] simultaneously fool all members of a homogeneous panel.

2. **Multi-round adaptive evasion accumulation (Huang et al. [5]):** Even when a single judge or homogeneous ensemble achieves a seemingly low single-pass miss rate of 4.7%–7.5% on static benchmarks, autonomous agents operating in iterative refinement loops can probe the judge across R adaptive attempts. As documented by Huang et al. [5], a 4.7%–6.5% per-round miss rate compounds across $R = 5$ adaptive rounds of formatting and cue manipulation into a $> 40\%$ cumulative evasion attack success rate (ASR).

3. **Ungrounded verdict reasoning and sequential panel herding (Eleftheriou et al. [2], Lee et al. [7], Mei and Douglas [9]):** When LLM judges evaluate complex trajectories without mechanical evidence-span verification, they frequently emit confident verdicts backed by fabricated or unfaithful rationales [2, 7]. Furthermore, if panel members observe one another's intermediate assessments before committing to a verdict, sycophantic conformity causes followers to herd behind an erroneous first speaker [16].

1.2 Contributions

In this paper, we formalize and evaluate **Cross-Substrate Rubric-Ranked Auditor Ensembles (`CS-RRAE`)**:

1. **Taxonomy of auditor manipulation mechanisms and ensemble defenses (Section 2).** We synthesize 2025–2026 findings on reward hacking [5], correlated model errors [4], deception detection [3, 19], and mechanical formalization [8, 9] into a unified defensive taxonomy (Table 1, Figure 1).

2. **Exact Gaussian-copula failure integrals, binary vs. latent correlation mapping, and Cantelli upper bound (Section 3).** We distinguish the latent Gaussian correlation ρ_{lat} from the pairwise binary indicator correlation $\rho_{\text{bin}} = \frac{\Phi_2(\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p}),\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p});\rho_{\text{lat}})-\bar{p}^2}{\bar{p}(1-\bar{p})}$ entering the ensemble variance. We separate the distribution-free Cantelli *upper bound* from the exact 1D Gaussian-copula failure integral, prove a finite-K majority failure lower bound $\frac{1}{2}\Phi(\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p})/\sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}})$, and derive the closed-form $K \to \infty$ SLLN asymptotic error floor $P_\infty(\bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}, \tau_{\text{maj}})$ (Equations 1–8).

3. **Three-layer CS-RRAE runtime specification and parameter provenance audit (Section 4).** We specify the cryptographic SHA-256 commit-reveal protocol, actual Python `ast.parse` mechanical span verifier, and parameter provenance table (Tables 2–3).

4. **Matched-base-error, cost-matched 19,200-trajectory benchmark and correlation calibration (Section 5).** Holding single-auditor base error rates strictly identical across all regimes ($p_{\text{miss},1} = 6.5\%, p_{\text{fp},1} = 14.0\%$) and comparing cost-matched $K = 3$ ensembles with and without AST span verification over concrete Python AST trajectories, we evaluate $n_{\text{adv}} = 600$ adversarial and $n_{\text{honest}} = 600$ benign trajectories per cell across $R \in \{1, 2, 3, 5\}$ rounds (19,200 trajectories) plus a 7,200-trajectory correlation sweep reporting both ρ_{lat} and ρ_{bin} (Tables 4–5, Figures 2–3).

5. **Counter-evidence, shared pre-training limits, and falsification protocol (Sections 6–8).** We examine universal adversarial transfers across model families [4], steganographic collusion [11], and six pre-registerable falsification protocols (Table 6).

2 Auditor failure modes and cross-substrate oversight primitives

Designing an alignment auditor ensemble capable of withstanding adaptive, multi-round optimization pressure requires addressing correlation, sequential herding, and ungrounded rationalization simultaneously. Table 1 maps five recurring oversight vulnerabilities onto canonical constructs from statistics, cryptography, and formal verification.

Table 1: Mapping automated oversight vulnerabilities to formal ensemble and verification constructs.

Vulnerability	Canonical construct	`CS-RRAE` component	Operational function	Primary grounding
Shared architectural blind spots	Equicorrelated Gaussian copula ($\rho_{\text{lat}}, \rho_{\text{bin}}$)	Cross-Substrate Panel ($\mathcal{E}_{\text{cross}}$)	Selects K distinct model families to minimize latent correlation ρ_{lat} and binary correlation ρ_{bin}	[4, 5, 14]
Sequential deliberation herding	Cryptographic commitment scheme (SHA-256)	Commit-Reveal Vote Sealer ($\mathcal{C}_{\text{seal}}$)	Requires every auditor k to publish $\mathrm{H}(v_k \,\|\, s_k \,\|\, \text{nonce}_k)$ before any peer rationale is revealed	[15–17]
Hallucinated or decoy rationales	Deterministic AST node/span predicate check	Mechanical Span Gate (Γ_{span})	Parses trajectory via `ast.parse` and assigns weight 0 to votes citing non-executable decoy lines or safe AST nodes	[7–10]
Multi-round adaptive cue gaming	Canonical AST normalization & stateful memory	Canonical Trace Normalizer ($\mathcal{N}_{\text{AST}}$)	Strips superficial markdown/formatting cues before audit and tracks cumulative query rounds R	[5, 12, 20]
Covert / out-of-sight state tampering	Dual transcript + environment state audit	Post-Condition State Hash ($\mathcal{H}_{\text{env}}$)	Cross-checks verbalized tool calls against container state diffs to catch out-of-sight tampering	[1, 3, 19]

The empirical findings summarized in Table 1 explain why naive scaling of homogeneous LLM judges fails under adversarial pressure. As shown by Goel et al. [4], when judges share high latent error correlation ($\rho_{\text{lat}} \approx 0.78$, corresponding to pairwise binary correlation $\rho_{\text{bin}} \approx 0.50$–$0.53$), adding more judges of the same family yields minimal reduction in ensemble miss rate. Moreover, Ferreira et al. [3] and Young [19] demonstrate that capable agents actively hide deceptive actions "out of sight" of standard transcript monitors or exploit presentation heuristics [5, 12]. Figure 1 illustrates how `CS-RRAE` combines canonical AST trace normalization, blind SHA-256 commit-reveal voting across $K = 3$ heterogeneous substrates, and a deterministic Python AST mechanical span verifier (Γ_{span}).




Figure 1: Architecture of the Cross-Substrate Rubric-Ranked Auditor Ensemble (`CS-RRAE`). Incoming agent trajectories τ_t are parsed into an abstract syntax tree (AST). Three heterogeneous auditor substrates ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.14$, binary error correlation $\rho_{\text{bin}} \approx 0.056$, Goel et al. [4]) independently evaluate the trace and seal their verdict $v_k \in \{0, 1\}$ and cited line/node span s_k via SHA-256 commit-reveal hashing. Upon reveal, the Mechanical Span Gate (Γ_{span}, Mei and Douglas [9]) walks the parsed AST to verify that s_k contains an executable statement matching the claimed rubric predicate before tallying the majority decision.

3 Formal mathematical framework

We formalize an auditor ensemble of K distinct model substrates $\mathcal{E} = \{M_1, \ldots, M_K\}$ evaluating an agent trajectory τ across up to $R \geq 1$ adaptive submission rounds.

3.1 Commit-reveal sealing and mechanical AST span-gated aggregation

In round $r \in \{1, \ldots, R\}$, each auditor M_k ($k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$) inspects the canonicalized trajectory τ in isolation and outputs a tuple (v_k, s_k, η_k), where $v_k \in \{0, 1\}$ is the binary violation verdict (1 = violation flagged, 0 = pass), s_k is the cited line/AST span, and $\eta_k \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$ is a cryptographic nonce. Prior to revealing any assessment, auditor k broadcasts the commitment $h_k = \text{SHA256}(v_k \,\|\, s_k \,\|\, \eta_k)$, preventing sequential herding [16].

Once all K commitments $\{h_1, \ldots, h_K\}$ are logged, the auditors reveal (v_k, s_k, η_k) and a deterministic mechanical AST span verifier $\Gamma_{\text{span}}(s_k, v_k, \tau) \in \{0, 1\}$ [9, 10] traverses the parsed syntax tree $\text{AST}(\tau)$: if $v_k = 1$ (flag), Γ_{span} checks that line s_k contains an executable AST node referencing a forbidden sink/symbol; if $v_k = 0$ (pass), Γ_{span} checks that s_k cites an executable statement node rather than a non-executable comment or docstring decoy line. The span-gated ensemble decision compares the verified votes against majority threshold $\tau_{\text{maj}} = 0.5$:

$$\hat{V}_{\text{CS}}(\tau) \;=\; \mathbf{1}\left[\sum_{k=1}^{K} \Gamma_{\text{span}}(s_k, v_k, \tau)\, v_k \;>\; \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \Gamma_{\text{span}}(s_k, v_k, \tau)\right]. \tag{1}$$

3.2 Latent vs. binary error correlation and the Cantelli upper bound

Let $e_k \in \{0,1\}$ denote the binary indicator that auditor k makes a classification error on trajectory τ, with marginal error probability $\mathbb{E}[e_k] = \bar{p} \in (0, \tau_{\text{maj}})$. Under an equicorrelated Gaussian copula, each auditor's error is driven by a standard normal latent variable $Z_k = \sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}}\, G + \sqrt{1-\rho_{\text{lat}}}\, \epsilon_k$ with $G, \epsilon_1, \ldots, \epsilon_K \overset{\text{i.i.d.}}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0,1)$, latent correlation $\rho_{\text{lat}} \in [0,1]$, and threshold $e_k = \mathbf{1}[Z_k \le \Phi^{-1}(\bar{p})]$.

Crucially, the **pairwise binary indicator correlation** $\rho_{\text{bin}} \triangleq \text{Corr}(e_j, e_k)$ is strictly smaller than ρ_{lat} for all $\rho_{\text{lat}} \in (0,1)$ because thresholding a bivariate normal attenuates linear correlation. Conditional on the common factor $G = z$, each auditor errs independently with conditional probability $p(z; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}) = \Phi\Big(\frac{\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p}) - \sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}}\, z}{\sqrt{1-\rho_{\text{lat}}}}\Big)$. Therefore, the joint probability $p_{11} = \Pr(e_j = 1, e_k = 1)$ and the resulting pairwise binary correlation ρ_{bin} are given exactly by:

$$p_{11}(\bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}) \;=\; \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \big[p(z; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}})\big]^2 \, \phi(z)\, dz, \qquad \rho_{\text{bin}}(\bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}) \;=\; \frac{p_{11}(\bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}) - \bar{p}^2}{\bar{p}(1-\bar{p})}. \tag{2}$$

For example, at marginal error $\bar{p} = 0.20$, a latent correlation of $\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.78$ yields $\rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.5346$ (while reaching $\rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.7800$ requires $\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.9505$). The variance of the empirical ensemble error rate $\bar{e}_K = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K} e_k$ depends on ρ_{bin}, not ρ_{lat}:

$$\text{Var}(\bar{e}_K) \;=\; \frac{\bar{p}(1-\bar{p})}{K}\Big[1 + (K-1)\rho_{\text{bin}}\Big]. \tag{3}$$

Applying Cantelli's one-sided Chebyshev inequality $\Pr(\bar{e}_K - \bar{p} \ge \tau_{\text{maj}} - \bar{p}) \le \frac{\text{Var}(\bar{e}_K)}{\text{Var}(\bar{e}_K) + (\tau_{\text{maj}} - \bar{p})^2}$ yields a **distribution-free moment upper bound** on the single-round ensemble failure probability:

$$P_{\text{fail}}(K; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}, \tau_{\text{maj}}) \;\le\; U_{\text{Cantelli}}(K; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{bin}}) \;\triangleq\; \frac{\bar{p}(1-\bar{p})\big[1 + (K-1)\rho_{\text{bin}}\big]}{\bar{p}(1-\bar{p})\big[1 + (K-1)\rho_{\text{bin}}\big] + K\big(\tau_{\text{maj}} - \bar{p}\big)^2}. \tag{4}$$

We emphasize that Equation (4) is an **upper bound**, not a lower bound: as $K \to \infty$, $U_{\text{Cantelli}}(K; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{bin}}) \to \frac{\bar{p}(1-\bar{p})\rho_{\text{bin}}}{\bar{p}(1-\bar{p})\rho_{\text{bin}} + (\tau_{\text{maj}} - \bar{p})^2}$, which bounds how bad any distribution with pairwise binary correlation ρ_{bin} can be, but does not by itself prove a positive lower error floor.

3.3 Exact Gaussian-copula failure integral, finite-K lower bound, and asymptotic floor

To establish the actual failure probability and a rigorous lower floor under the equicorrelated Gaussian copula, we condition directly on the shared normal factor $G = z$. Because $e_1, \ldots, e_K$ are conditionally i.i.d. Bernoulli$(p(z; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}))$ given $G = z$, the exact majority-failure probability for any finite panel size K is the one-dimensional Gaussian integral:

$$P_{\text{fail}}(K; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}, \tau_{\text{maj}}) \;=\; \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \sum_{j=\lceil \tau_{\text{maj}} K \rceil}^{K} \binom{K}{j} p(z)^j \, (1 - p(z))^{K-j} \, \phi(z)\, dz. \tag{5}$$

From Equation (5), two exact lower and asymptotic properties follow directly for any $\rho_{\text{lat}} \in (0,1)$:

1. **Closed-form $K \to \infty$ asymptotic failure floor:** By the Strong Law of Large Numbers conditional on G, as $K \to \infty$, $\bar{e}_K \xrightarrow{\text{a.s.}} p(G; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}})$. Since $p(z; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}})$ is strictly decreasing in z, the event $\{p(G) \ge \tau_{\text{maj}}\}$ is identical to $\{G \le z^*(\tau_{\text{maj}})\}$ where $z^*(\tau_{\text{maj}}) = \frac{\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p}) - \sqrt{1-\rho_{\text{lat}}}\, \Phi^{-1}(\tau_{\text{maj}})}{\sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}}}$. Thus, the exact asymptotic failure rate as $K \to \infty$ is strictly positive:

$$\lim_{K \to \infty} P_{\text{fail}}(K; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}, \tau_{\text{maj}}) \;=\; P_{\infty}(\bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}, \tau_{\text{maj}}) \;=\; \Phi\left(\frac{\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p}) - \sqrt{1-\rho_{\text{lat}}}\, \Phi^{-1}(\tau_{\text{maj}})}{\sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}}}\right) \;>\; 0. \tag{6}$$

2. **Explicit finite-K lower bound for majority voting ($\tau_{\text{maj}} = 1/2$, odd K):** Since $\Phi^{-1}(1/2) = 0$, whenever $G \leq z^*(1/2) = \Phi^{-1}(\bar{p})/\sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}}$, the conditional error rate satisfies $p(G) \geq 1/2$, so $\Pr(\text{Binomial}(K, p(G)) \geq (K+1)/2 \mid G) \geq 1/2$. Conditioning on $\{G \leq z^*(1/2)\}$ yields the explicit universal lower bound for all odd $K \geq 1$:

$$P_{\text{fail}}(K; \bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}, 1/2) \;\geq\; \frac{1}{2}\,\Phi\!\left(\frac{\Phi^{-1}(\bar{p})}{\sqrt{\rho_{\text{lat}}}}\right) \;>\; 0. \tag{7}$$

Finally, across R adaptive revision rounds [5], if round r has panel miss probability $P_{\text{fail},r}$, the cumulative R-round evasion rate under independent round draws is:

$$\text{ASR}_{\text{cum}}(R) \;=\; 1 \;-\; \prod_{r=1}^{R} (1 - P_{\text{fail},r}). \tag{8}$$

4 System specification and parameter provenance

Tables 2 and 3 document the engineering maturity of the `CS-RRAE` components and the exact provenance of every parameter in our simulation (`experiment.py`).

Table 2: Readiness and operational bottlenecks of `CS-RRAE` oversight subsystems.

Subsystem	Maturity	Supporting published evidence	Realistic deployment bottleneck
Cross-substrate panel ($\mathcal{E}_{\text{cross}}$)	Production ready	Cross-family ensembles mitigate correlated prediction errors [4, 14]	Running $K = 3$ distinct model families triples inference compute per audited turn
SHA-256 commit-reveal sealing	Production ready	Eliminates sequential herding and sycophantic cascades in multi-agent panels [16, 17]	Adds one network round-trip ($\approx$ 1–5 ms) between hash broadcast and reveal
Python AST span gate (Γ_{span})	Benchmark validated	`AutoForm` [9] and `FActScore` [10] reject ungrounded/hallucinated rationales [7]	Subtle semantic omissions or external helper calls not resolvable by local syntax trees escape AST filtering
Stateful multi-round budget (R)	Empirically critical	Single-round 4.7%–6.5% miss rates compound to $> 40\%$ over $R = 5$ adaptive rounds [5]	Requires persistent session-level rate limiting so an agent cannot reset its retry counter

Table 3: Parameter provenance and calibration audit for the Milestone 24 auditor benchmark (`experiment.py`).

Parameter / Mechanism	Value / Range	Provenance Class	Empirical / Theoretical Justification
Balanced evaluation split	$n_{\text{adv}} = 600$, $n_{\text{honest}} = 600$ / cell	Mechanistically executed	Exact deterministic denominator split (1,200 episodes/cell, 19,200 total) with asymmetric Wilson score CIs
Matched single-judge base errors	$p_{\text{miss},1} = 6.5\%$, $p_{\text{fp},1} = 14.0\%$	Strictly matched across arms	Held identical across all 4 regimes; calibrated to Huang et al. [5] (+1.1%/round miss, +0.8%/round FP)
Latent vs. binary correlation	$\rho_{\text{lat}} \in \{0.14, 0.78\} \Rightarrow \rho_{\text{bin}} \in \{0.056, 0.497\}$	Quadrature-calibrated	Exact 401-node Gaussian quadrature (Eq. 2) + bisection inversion across $\rho_{\text{lat}} \in [0.00, 0.9505]$
Real Python AST span gate (Γ_{span})	`ast.parse` + `ast.walk` node check	Mechanistically executed	Parses adversarial (`sys.exit(0)`, `os.environ`, `pytest.skip`, `eval`) and benign Python snippets
Cue-decoy vs. structural misses	65% decoy line / 35% structural; 72% local FP	Model assumption	Decoy comment/docstring passes and local benign FPs are caught by `ast.walk`; structural/external misses survive

5 Analytic copula calibration and matched-error simulation results

We implemented and executed a reproducible Python benchmark (`experiment.py`) that (1) computes exact 401-node Gaussian quadrature integrals comparing latent correlation ρ_{lat}, pairwise binary correlation ρ_{bin}, exact finite-K copula failure, the closed-form $K \to \infty$ SLLN floor P_∞, and the Cantelli upper bound (Table 4), and (2) evaluates 19,200 agent trajectories across four auditing architectures and adaptive evasion depths $R \in \{1, 2, 3, 5\}$ under **strictly matched single-auditor base error rates** ($n_{\text{adv}} = 600$ and $n_{\text{honest}} = 600$ per cell), plus a 7,200-trajectory correlation sensitivity sweep at $R = 5$ (Table 5, Figures 2–3).

Table 4: Exact analytic calibration of latent Gaussian correlation ρ_{lat} vs. pairwise binary indicator correlation ρ_{bin} (Eq. 2), i.i.d. binomial failure ($\rho_{\text{bin}} = 0$), exact finite-K Gaussian-copula failure (Eq. 5), finite-K lower bound (Eq. 7), exact $K \to \infty$ asymptotic floor P_∞ (Eq. 6), and Cantelli moment upper bound (Eq. 4).

Panel / Base Error	ρ_{lat}	ρ_{bin} (Exact)	i.i.d. Binomial (%)	Finite-K Lower Bd (%)	Exact Copula P_{fail} (%)	Exact $K\to\infty$ Floor P_∞ (%)	Cantelli Upper Bd (%)
K=3, $\bar{p}$=0.109	0.0000	0.0000	3.305	0.000	3.305	0.000	17.475
K=3, $\bar{p}$=0.109	0.1400	0.0557	3.305	0.025	4.468	0.050	19.051
K=3, $\bar{p}$=0.109	0.5000	0.2547	3.305	2.037	7.387	4.074	24.220
K=3, $\bar{p}$=0.109	0.7800	0.4965	3.305	4.077	9.440	8.154	29.677
K=25, $\bar{p}$=0.200	0.0000	0.0000	0.037	0.000	0.037	0.000	6.639
K=25, $\bar{p}$=0.200	0.1400	0.0720	0.037	0.612	2.773	1.225	16.251
K=25, $\bar{p}$=0.200	0.7800	0.5346	0.037	8.515	17.239	17.031	49.584
K=25, $\bar{p}$=0.200	0.9505	0.7800	0.037	9.700	19.437	19.399	58.373

5.1 Compared cost-matched auditing regimes

To isolate the effect of substrate diversity from the effect of mechanical AST span verification without giving any regime a privileged base error rate, all four regimes share the exact same single-judge base miss probability $p_{\text{miss}}(r) = 0.065 + 0.011(r-1)$ and benign false-positive probability $p_{\text{fp}}(r) = 0.140 + 0.008(r-1)$:

- **Single Homogeneous Judge (`single_homogeneous_judge`, $K = 1$):** A single LLM judge without mechanical AST span verification.
- **Homogeneous Majority Ensemble (`homogeneous_majority_ensemble`, $K = 3$):** Three judges from the same model family ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.78 \Rightarrow \rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.4965$ at $R = 5$) with unsealed sequential deliberation.
- **Cross-Substrate Unverified Ensemble (`cross_substrate_unverified_3x`, $K = 3$):** A cost-matched $K = 3$ cross-substrate panel ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.14 \Rightarrow \rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.0557$ at $R = 5$) with SHA-256 commit-reveal sealing, but *without* the Python AST span verifier Γ_{span}.
- **Proposed CS-RRAE (`cs_rrae_proposed`, $K = 3$):** Cost-matched $K = 3$ cross-substrate panel ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.14, \rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.0557$) with SHA-256 commit-reveal sealing *and* deterministic `ast.parse` / `ast.walk` span verification (Γ_{span}).

Table 5: Matched-base-error auditor ensemble benchmark across 19,200 trajectories ($n_{\text{adv}} = 600$ adversarial and $n_{\text{honest}} = 600$ benign trajectories per cell across $R \in \{1, 2, 3, 5\}$ adaptive rounds). Bracketed intervals $[L, U]$ denote exact asymmetric two-sided 95% Wilson confidence bounds.

Auditor Architecture	Evasion R=1 (%)	Evasion R=3 (%)	Evasion R=5 (%)	Detection R=5 (%)	Benign FP R=5 (%)
Single Homog. (1×)	7.50 [5.65, 9.89]	23.83 [20.60, 27.40]	45.83 [41.89, 49.83]	54.17 [50.17, 58.11]	20.00 [16.99, 23.39]
Homog. Majority (3×)	5.00 [3.52, 7.05]	20.17 [17.15, 23.56]	42.50 [38.60, 46.49]	57.50 [53.51, 61.40]	15.83 [13.13, 18.97]
Cross-Sub. Unver. (3×)	2.00 [1.15, 3.46]	9.67 [7.55, 12.29]	20.00 [16.99, 23.39]	80.00 [76.61, 83.01]	10.17 [8.00, 12.84]
CS-RRAE + AST (3×)	**1.00 [0.46, 2.16]**	**3.33 [2.17, 5.09]**	**9.67 [7.55, 12.29]**	**90.33 [87.71, 92.45]**	**1.67 [0.91, 3.04]**

5.2 Quantitative findings

Tables 4–5 and Figures 2–3 establish four key findings:

1. **Exact copula failure floor vs. Cantelli upper bound (Table 4).** At $K = 25$ and $\bar{p} = 0.20$, an i.i.d. binomial model ($\rho_{\text{bin}} = 0$) predicts a 0.037% majority failure rate. Under a homogeneous latent correlation of $\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.78$ (which induces binary error correlation $\rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.5346$), the exact 1D copula integral yields 17.239% failure—465× higher than i.i.d. binomial—bounded below by the finite-K bound 8.515% (Eq. 7), converging to the exact $K \to \infty$ SLLN floor $P_\infty = 17.031\%$ (Eq. 6), and bounded above by the distribution-free Cantelli upper bound 49.584% (Eq. 4).
2. **Single-round evaluations mask multi-round evasion accumulation (Huang et al. [5]).** Under matched base error rates, a single judge suffers 7.50% [5.65%, 9.89%] evasion at $R = 1$, compounding to 45.83% [41.89%, 49.83%] across $R = 5$ adaptive rounds. Because three homogeneous judges share high binary correlation ($\rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.4965$ at $R = 5$) and suffer

unsealed herding, 3× homogeneous voting reduces 5-round evasion by only 3.33 percentage points to 42.50% [38.60%, 46.49%].

3. **Decomposing cross-substrate diversity vs. mechanical AST span verification at equal $K = 3$ budget.** Replacing the $K = 3$ homogeneous panel ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.78$) with a cost-matched $K = 3$ cross-substrate panel ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.14, \rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.0557$) and SHA-256 commit-reveal sealing *without* AST span verification cuts 5-round evasion more than in half from 42.50% to 20.00% [16.99%, 23.39%]. Adding the Python `ast.parse` mechanical span verifier (Γ_{span}) in `CS-RRAE` rejects decoy-comment passes and hallucinated benign flags, cutting 5-round evasion by another 2.07× to 9.67% [7.55%, 12.29%] (90.33% [87.71%, 92.45%] verified detection) and reducing benign false positives from 10.17% [8.00%, 12.84%] to 1.67% [0.91%, 3.04%] at a measured Python AST verification cost of 134.87 μs [127.66, 142.08] per trajectory.

4. **Sensitivity across latent (ρ_{lat}) and binary (ρ_{bin}) correlation.** Sweeping $\rho_{\text{lat}} \in \{0.00, 0.14, 0.30, 0.50, 0.78$ ($\rho_{\text{bin}} \in \{0.000, 0.056, 0.133, 0.255, 0.497, 0.658\}$) at $R = 5$ ($n_{\text{adv}} = 600, n_{\text{honest}} = 600$ per point) shows that 5-round evasion under `CS-RRAE` rises monotonically from 6.83% [5.08%, 9.14%] ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.00$) to 8.83% [6.82%, 11.37%] ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.14$), 11.33% [9.04%, 14.12%] ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.30$), 16.17% [13.44%, 19.33%] ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.50$), 24.83% [21.54%, 28.44%] ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.78$), and 35.33% [31.61%, 39.24%] ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.90$).




Figure 2: Matched-base-error comparison of Verified Adversarial Detection Rate (higher is better), Cumulative 5-Round Evasion ASR (lower is better), and Benign Trajectory False-Positive Rate (lower is better) at $R = 5$ adaptive rounds ($n_{\text{adv}} = 600$ and $n_{\text{honest}} = 600$ per cell; error bars denote exact asymmetric 95% Wilson confidence intervals).




Figure 3: Cumulative auditor evasion ASR across adaptive evasion rounds $R \in \{1, 2, 3, 5\}$ under matched single-judge base error rates. Cost-matched $K = 3$ comparisons isolate the reduction from cross-substrate decorrelation ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.78 \to 0.14$, reducing $R = 5$ evasion from 42.50% to 20.00%) and the additional reduction from Python AST mechanical span verification (20.00% $\to$ 9.67%).

6 Shared pre-training transfers, steganography, and cost limits

Three counter-evidence mechanisms limit the independence and completeness of cross-substrate auditor ensembles:

1. **Cross-family adversarial transferability from shared web pre-training (Goel et al. [4]).** `CS-RRAE` assumes that selecting auditors from distinct model families achieves low latent error correlation $\rho_{\text{lat}} \approx 0.14$ ($\rho_{\text{bin}} \approx 0.056$). However, Goel et al. [4] show that when nominally distinct model families are pre-trained on overlapping internet corpora and post-trained on similar public preference datasets, their empirical error correlation on out-of-distribution edge cases can exceed $\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.50$–0.78 ($\rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.25$–0.50). As our sensitivity sweep demonstrates, if shared pre-training pushes $\rho_{\text{lat}} \geq 0.78$, 5-round evasion climbs from 9.67% to 24.83% even with AST span verification.

2. **Omission and out-of-sight attacks lacking a citeable AST span (Ferreira et al. [3], Young [19]).** The Mechanical Span Gate Γ_{span} checks whether cited lines contain executable AST nodes matching the rubric predicate. When an agent commits a violation of *omission* or mutates external state out-of-sight of the logged code [3], or when a structural blind spot causes an auditor to cite a benign executable line (35% of misses in our model), syntax-only span verification cannot catch the error without dynamic execution state diffs $\mathcal{H}_{\text{env}}$.

3. **Information-theoretic steganographic collusion (Motwani et al. [11], Roger and Greenblatt [13]).** While AST parsing strips whitespace and formatting cues, Motwani et al. [11] prove that capable language models can embed steganographic payloads in semantic identifier or control-flow choices that survive syntactic normalization.

7 Limitations

- **Synthetic AST corpus and Gaussian-copula simulation versus live multi-family LLM inference.** While `experiment.py` executes real Python `ast.parse` and `ast.walk` verification over concrete code templates and exact quadrature-calibrated Gaussian copulas, auditor error indicators are sampled from the calibrated copula model rather than running live LLM inference across proprietary model APIs. Furthermore, the 65% decoy-line share among misses and 72% AST-resolvable share among benign false positives are explicit model assumptions documented in Table 3.
- $3\times$ **inference cost multiplier.** Running $K = 3$ heterogeneous auditors on every high-stakes turn increases monitoring token cost by $3\times$ relative to a single judge, motivating tiered cascade routing where single-judge passes with high conformal uncertainty [2, 18] trigger the full $K = 3$ cross-substrate panel.

8 Pre-registerable falsification protocol

Table 6 specifies six pre-registerable empirical tests to falsify the statistical and security claims of `CS-RRAE`.

Table 6: Six pre-registerable falsification tests for Cross-Substrate Rubric-Ranked Auditor Ensembles (`CS-RRAE`).

Protocol	Hypothesis	Design and primary metrics	Falsified if
P1. Empirical tetrachoric (ρ_{lat}) & binary (ρ_{bin}) correlation	Cross-family selection achieves $\rho_{\text{bin}} \leq 0.15$ ($\rho_{\text{lat}} \leq 0.30$) vs. $\rho_{\text{bin}} \geq 0.45$ for same-family prompts [4]	Measure both tetrachoric (ρ_{lat}) and Pearson binary (ρ_{bin}) error correlation across 1,000 reward-hacking traces [5] on 3 model families	Realized cross-family binary error correlation ρ_{bin} exceeds 0.20 after AST trace normalization
P2. Multi-round evasion suppression (Eq. 8)	Cost-matched $K = 3$ `CS-RRAE` holds 5-round adaptive evasion ASR below 12% where single judges exceed 40% [5]	Run $R = 5$ adaptive red-team revision rounds across $n_{\text{adv}} = 600$ live reward-hacking tasks under matched token budgets	Cumulative 5-round evasion ASR under `CS-RRAE` exceeds 15.0%
P3. Mechanical AST span gate FP reduction	Requiring $\Gamma_{\text{span}} = 1$ reduces benign false positives below 3.0% on complex honest traces	Evaluate $n_{\text{honest}} = 600$ multi-file coding trajectories with and without `ast.parse` span verification [7, 9]	Benign false-positive rate under `CS-RRAE` exceeds 3.5%
P4. Commit-reveal anti-herding	SHA-256 commit-reveal sealing eliminates sequential first-speaker herding bias [16]	Inject a corrupted first-speaker rationale in $K = 3$ panels across 400 trials; compare sealed vs. unsealed follower error	Sealed follower error changes by $> 0.5\%$ when a peer auditor is compromised
P5. Asymptotic copula floor scaling (Eq. 6)	Increasing homogeneous panel size from $K = 3$ to $K = 9$ fails to beat $K = 3$ cross-substrate `CS-RRAE`	Compare $K = 9$ same-family majority vote ($\rho_{\text{lat}} \approx 0.78$) against $K = 3$ `CS-RRAE` ($\rho_{\text{lat}} \approx 0.14$) at $R = 5$	$K = 9$ homogeneous ensemble achieves lower 5-round evasion than $K = 3$ cross-substrate `CS-RRAE`
P6. Out-of-sight state diff integration	Appending post-condition state diffs $\mathcal{H}_{\text{env}}$ catches $> 90\%$ of covert out-of-sight tampering [3]	Evaluate 300 covert environment-mutation attacks omitted from verbalized tool logs	Out-of-sight attack evasion exceeds 10.0% when $\mathcal{H}_{\text{env}}$ diffs are included in τ

9 Conclusion

Automated oversight of autonomous agents cannot rely on naive majority voting over homogeneous LLM judges: when judges share architectural and pre-training blind spots ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.78$, binary error correlation $\rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.4965$, Goel et al. [4]), a 5.00%–7.50% single-round miss rate compounds across $R = 5$ adaptive revision rounds into a 42.50%–45.83% cumulative evasion rate [5]. By distinguishing the distribution-free Cantelli upper bound from the exact Gaussian-copula failure integral and closed-form $K \to \infty$ SLLN asymptotic floor $P_\infty(\bar{p}, \rho_{\text{lat}}, \tau_{\text{maj}})$, and combining cost-matched $K = 3$ cross-substrate diversity ($\rho_{\text{lat}} = 0.14, \rho_{\text{bin}} = 0.0557$), SHA-256 commit-reveal vote sealing [16], and deterministic Python `ast.parse` evidence-span verification (Γ_{span}, Mei and Douglas [9]), `CS-RRAE` reduces 5-round cumulative evasion under matched base error rates from 42.50% (3× homogeneous) and 20.00% (3× unverified cross-substrate) to 9.67% $[7.55\%, 12.29\%]$ while cutting benign false positives from 20.00% to 1.67% $[0.91\%, 3.04\%]$.

Use of AI tools

Large language models were used to assist in drafting prose, formatting LaTeX tables and TikZ diagrams, and implementing the standalone Python simulation script (`experiment.py`). Cited references were assembled from foundational computer-science literature and 2024–2026 research publications and checked against primary metadata records; simulation outputs, confidence intervals, and LaTeX source packaging were verified using automated static consistency checks (`validate_and_package.py`).

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